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PRCBlJfG TWO OnEF EXHiniVES SCHEMATIC KNOWLEDGE (F THE US STEEL INDUSTRY USING O0C3mTVE MAPS.
Our ultunate theoretical curiosity concerns organizational transformations. One objective is learning
about transformations from the vantage point of industry insiders, viewing industry transformations as
cognitive phenomeia (as opposed to studies which consider only technical/material phenomena). This paper
describes some preliminary analysis from an empirical research project concerning the steel industry.
Our principal methodological innovation involves using cognitive mapping. Specific empirical
research presented in this paper includes analysis of cognitive maps derived from statements attributable
to Mr. David Roderick (chairman of U.S. Steel) and Mr. FX, Iverson (CEO of Nucor Steel) which we
analyzed using a computer program.
Lastly, the paper describes how this study fits into a long range research program for studies of
industry transformations.

VHAT WE KNOW (AND DCN'T KNOW) ABOUT SIT^AIBSY
For about 20 years scholars have studied several empirical themes in the policy/strategic management
field, with varying success. These principal foci include; strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962),
environment and strategy (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1%7; Lawrence & Dyer, 1983), generic strategies (Miles
I
& Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980), and strategy and performance (Rumelt, 1974). Although these theories/
studies contribute important findings about strategy, they share some limitations. Many studies are
cross-sectional, take an abstract macro-level view, rely on meagre direct contact with organizations
under the microscope, and use oiultivariate statistics to reach conclusions (e;.g. Hambrick, 1984). Even
though theorists claim that "environmaits" affect "strategy", we don't know why or how. We need to know
more about how managers maneuver between environmental facts and circumstances, organizational
structures, and strategic actions.
Therefore, sooner or later we must study strategists' thinking. Strategists thinking patterns
provide the bridge between environmental and company circumstances and strategic actions. Some
researchers now recognize the need to study the cognitive dimensions of strategy (Schwenk, 1964; Barnes,
1984; Isenberg, 1985; Walsh, 1985; Stubbart & Ramaprasad, 1985).
SCHEMA THEORY AND INimTOllVE APPROACHES TD SIT^ATEEY
t Active Processing . Situations involving effortful, complex information processing have been
characterized as "active-synthetic":
"A large part of the interpretation of sensory data is provided by the knowledge of what the
signal must be, rather than from the information contained in the signal itself. This extra
information comes from the context of the sensory event" (Lindsay and Normann, 1972, p. 133).
Active-synthetic processes rule out the potential for an "objective" environment because "the
environment" cannot be separated from the "strategist-observer." "Information" requires an interaction
between an observer and stimuli (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Neisser, 1967).
t Enactment. Weick (1979) introduced "enactment" into the organization and management Literature.
Enactment is a process of actively bracketing experience into concepts and defining relationships between
concepts. "Enacted realities" arrive, prosper, persist, or vanish as a function of complex, active
processes which strategists impose on the stream of experience— rather than as an imposition of
,
^Loiinanent, objective environmental structures upon ttK mind of a strategist (%Smircich and Stubbart,
1
1965). Therefore, enactment is the orgaiu-zation-theory parallel to the cognitive psycholgist's "active-
synthetic."
Enactment is not envisioned as a process of incremental 1 y reducing the gap between perceptions
versus "reality". Instead, enactment is an active psychological and behavioral process of constructing,
modifying, and applying interpretations which can serve as a basis for meaningful action (%Smircich &
Stubbart, 1985; Chaffee, 1965).
t Strategy. Strategists float in a rich, kaleidoscopic array of potential stimuli — facts, beliefs,
gossip, rumors, trends, ideas, etc For a probing mind, immense sets of cognitive enticements from this
crazy-quilt universe afford a manifold array of potential inductions, deductions, inferences,
interpretations, speculations, presumptions and conclusions. Since strategies are not dictated by
customs, practices or beliefs, strategy making represents an enactment process sine qua non.
9 Schemas. Schema theory offers a partial explanation of how strategists enact sense out of non-sense
and chaos. Schemas are the cognitive dimension of enacted environments. A schema resembles a format for a
computer program (Neisser, 1976). Accumulated experience — in the form of templates or frameworks —
guides information processing, inferences, and decision making (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Taylor & Crocker,
1961). Walsh (1985) has shown, for example, how manager's "success schemas" affect their information
processing about strategic problems.
Consequently, the substance of "the environment", organizational strengths and weaknesses, strategic
alternatives, objectives, and so forth depend upon schematic knowledge that a strategist brings to the
situation (Kiesler & SprtxiLl, 1982). Enactment produces schemas. Schemas guide enactment. Schemas
can reduce the environmental maze to manageable cognitive dimensions (Bougon et al., 1977). To
unda-stand a strategist's thoughts (and actions) it would be helpful to understand her schemas.
> Summary. Findings in cognitive psychology support the idea of enactment. Schema theory suggests a
conjecture that "enacted environments" are located in a strategist's schemas.
STUDYING TNIUSIRY TRANSKRMATICNS
The steel industry has been studied as an economic process (Crandall,1981), a historical process
(Hogan,1971), a technological change process (Off.Tech. Asses.,198D), a political process (Borrus, 1963)
and a class-conflict (Stone, 1974). Such perspectives reflect an abiding commitment to explanations
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which rely on aiduring structural forces "causing" the steel industry to change.
We proceed with different questions about industry change. We want to know how shifting mental
schemas and evocative images — "enactments" — relate to industry transformations. How, when, and why
. do enacted environments change? These questions motivate our research program.
THE STEEL MUSIOT
Because our society purportedly hovers on the threshold of an age of information-processing and
high-technology: "smokestack" industries have rapidly lost their glamour. Our colleagues expressed
surprise when we elected to study the dull steel industry rather than fashionable, exciting industries
such as computers, micro-electronics, or bio-technology. The ItS. steel industry conveys an image of
big, dirty, archaic, manufacturing«»«and failure. People call steel a "sunset" industry. Steel-
producing regions are branded "the rust bowl". Management of steel companies are held in contempt,
Beleagured. Forlorn. Desolate. Cataclysmic images grip steel. Titles from recent publications
express relentless pessimism: '*nME RUNS OUT FDR STEEL" (Businessweek, 1983), "STEEL BELTEEf'
(Chapman, 1979), "EMBATTLED SIHL" (ChaUenge, May-June 1978), 'SIEEL -UPHEAVAL IN A BASIC INDUSTRY"
(Bamett & Schorsch, 1983X
But, merely thirty years ago steel reigned in manufacturing:
'In 1950 America's steel industry was the most powerful in the world. Accounting for nearly one-half
of global steel output, it produced more steel than all of Europe combined, nearly three times as
much as the Communist bloc, and almost twenty times as much as jkpan. Moreover, the large .American
steel firms enjoyed an undisputed position of world leadership in technology and plant scale —the
probability that any of them would ever rise to challenge American mastery in steel seemed extremely
remote. (Adams and Mueller, 1962, p.73)
Steelmakers confidently proclaimed their accoraplishnsnts and invincibility:
.
"Americans, of course, don't like to take second place in any league, so they expect their steel
f industry to be bigger and more productive than the steel industry of any other nation or earth. It
is; but what many Americans do not know is that their own steel industry is bigger than those of all
the other nations an earth put together. No other nation in t±e world could have matched that
record. It is a record that stands in glorious tribute to the men who make steel and the men who
txiilt steel in America" (Ben Fairless, president of US Steel, JanJ951).
Thirty years is not such a long time from a strat^ic management perspective. Massive, abrupt changes
provoke curiosity.
I
The rest of this paper describes our efforts to elicit strategists' enacted environments, in the
form of their .srhemas about steel industry conditions, using cognitive mapping.
MEIHODCLDGY: aXNTTIVE MAPPING USING (XMFUrEK SCFIWARE
t MEIHG}, First, our research group found out everything we could about the steel industry and its
history. We collected a formidable array of articles, books, studies, interviews; attaided conventions,
and even watched films. We zeroed in on the time period 1979-1984, reasoning that '79-'84 represented a
period of excitement, and potentially startling transformation within steel. We selected three steel
industry participants who represent important groups — Thvid Roderick (chairman of ILS. Steel), Lloyd
MarBride (head of the steelworker's union), and Kenneth Iverson (president of Nucor—a steel mini-
millX The data from the Roderick study mainly include analysis of his public statements about the
industry between 1978 and 1984.
-What is '^Ilognitive Mapping?" Cognitive mapping includes several different techniques for
identifying, representing, manipulating, and evaluating texts. Most cognitive maps have been a form
content-analysis, relying on published documents. Cognitive mapping was first used by Tolman (an
experimental psychologist) in 1948. Qty planners used cognitive maps to explore the theme of man in his
physical environment; investigating how individuals "map" and interpret their architectural surroundings
(Lynch, 1960). Later, political scientists began using cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976X
The emergence of the personal computer has heightened the practical potentials of mapping
(Ramaprasad & Poor, 1985). Cognitive mapping can help decision makers cope with the enormous cognitive
complexity of policy problems by providing an interactive manipulable, external representation of complex
relationships (Ramaprasad & Pbon, 1985; Eden et aU 1979; Diffenhach, 1962; Maruyama, 1963).
- Ihe Maps
. An examination of seva-al maps follows. The maps span two strategists' statements
regarding steel industry conditions. Ihe source-texts were not chosen ramdoraly. After examining many
docijments, we selected texts which expressed the strategists' recurring themes. For Roderick's maps
(RCDtxtl, R[X)txt2) we enlisted the cooperation ILS. Steel Company. Mr. Iverson's maps were derived from
one speech he made (IVsp) plus personal interviews (IVpi) and a questionnaire (IVq) which Mr. Iverson
completed (See References, "Research Texts").
- Mapping Process
. Cognitive mapping is qualitative, but not arbitrary. Coding proceeded according
to elaborate rules developed by Wrightson (1976). Three judges independently examined documentary data
to identify the concepts mentioned within a text and to code the cause-effect relationships between
concepts, according to the text. 4
To facilitate analysis, cognitive maps are best represented as a matrix of relationships
(Raraaprasad & Poon,1985; Eden et aL»1979). These matrices contain cause-effect relationships stipulated
by the text [see Exhibit Che CRCDtxt2) and Exhibit Two (Ivq)]. Algebraic (not statistical) manipulaticn
I of such matrices generates useful information. The description, comparison, and evaluation of these
matrices support the theoretical level of the research.
- Aggregating Concepts into Categories. Analysis of Mr. Roderick's statements produced a total of
206 linked concepts. Judges sorted the 208 concepts into natural categories — drawn from the data.
Judges discerned three appropriate levels of aggregation: all 208 concepts, 30 intermediate categories
and 5 major categories. Exhibit One shows RCDtxt2 in matrix form at the level of 30 intermediate
categories. Aggregating facilitates understanding the overall text. Examining matrices helped us to
obtain insights. Manipulations expose subtle patterns, hidden among diverse categories. Mapping
crystallizes these interrelationships. Analysis also included qualitative interpretation of the texts.
A FIESr STEP: ANALYSIS CF RCJERICK'S STATTMENIS
9 OCWIECr. Between 1978 and 1964 the entire domestic steel industry suffered a cumulative net loss. For
a long time, LBS (United States Steel Co.) has watched its market share declining, its plants closing,
and its debt rising. Mr. Roderick was elected chairman of USS in 1979. During the period under
examination he also served as the head of the American Ircn and Steel Institute (attentive to the
interests of integrated steel companies). In 1983 he orchestrated the Marathon Oil merger, a significant
strategic departure for USS.
9 Fl]RPC6E- Qir first study was designed to test the feasibility of integrating industry transformation,
schemas, and enactment. We were searching for methods to unearth, systematize, and explore a
strategist's schematic knowledge of steel industry conditions.
9 WHAT WE mm gjr from the rcterioc study.
lOE: The detailed analyis of that study is available in Stubbart & Raraaprasad (1985).
i
I - Complex Policy Problems? According to Mason & Mitroff (1981), "wicked" problems elude definitive
problem formulation, harbor ambiguous explanations, hide important feedback loops, offer a kaliedoecopic
arrary of plausible solutions, and demand tradeoffs (pp. lO-OX Initially, we espected that the steel
,
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industry "problem" was a wicked problem.
The cognitive maps generated from Mr. Roderick's statements are complex. But, in most respects,
Roderick's statements — in substance as well as tone — fail to confirm that steel industry problems are
ill-structured policy problems. Instead, he says they are simple (but tough) problems. Steel industry ,
problems are essentially problems of control and power — not complex, uncertain problems. In these
respects, our cognitive map of Roderick's statements shares similarities with maps derived by Axalrod (1976).
- Costive Simplifications. Schwenk (1984), Barnes (1984) and Walsh (1985) have studied the process
of cognitive simplification in strategic management. Whether strategists can consistently think
effectively about complex problems remains an unsettled issue. Our evidence shows that Roderick's policy
recommendations systematically over-simplify the ramifications of his statements. Many of his policy
recommendations have (according to his own stipulations) important indirect consequences which apparently
defeat his purposes (Exhibit Three).
- Where are the Uncgtainties? Dealing with uncertainties always poses a key strategic challenge.
Psychological research shows that decision naakers often prefer to ignore or forget about nrvw-rflinriP*;
(Carter, 1971). Mr. Roderick's statements don't disclose many questions or quandaries.
- Ideological Commitments. The texts unreservedly extolls the virtues of "free enterprise" and "free
trade," condemning government "intervention" in business. They castigate foreign governments which
engage in all sorts of "unfair", "predatory", "protectionist" activities. Indeed, the texts view these
iss> ips in a moral light. ^Jevertheless, Mr. Roderick rails far United States government activism and
intervention on behalf of his beleagured industry. But, intervention must promote free trade, not hinder
it. The texts advocate protection in the name of free trade. What's interesting is how they combine the
"economic struggle for existence" with ideas of fairness, equity, and sharing.
- Control: The Fblitics of Helplesgiess. Mr. Roderick's statements express deep equivocation
regarding the role of the U.S. government in the steel industry. The statements blame the U.S.
government for neglecting the domestic steel industry. Distrust in the LLS. government goes hand in hand
with life-or-death dependence upon that powerful government. Tlie statements describe machinations of
malevolent forces, making the domestic companies helpless. Is this the dark side of "illusions of
control" (Larwood & Whittaker, 1977). 3iall we name this "disillusions of control?"
- Solutions. When Mr. Roderick talks about solutions he mentions going back to the status quo
ante. Mr. Roderick expresses no vision of the shape of the future steel industry except for grim
allusions to "1984". Competiton is the solution. But the tdnd of competition needed is a gentlemanly,
polite kind, not a Eferwinian kind. Cooperative competition. The statements argue for a safety net.
ISolutions involve governments and companies: ". . . all get together and define some rules we could all
accept in common" (I?CDtxt2).
- Imagery. These statements lack vivid evocative imagery. They argue for retaliating against an
invader. The metaphor of "invasions" reminds one of heroic archtypes. Domestic steel interests play the
role of the helpless community under attack. Someone must protect this community from greedy, violent
intruders (Importers). A hero is needed. Heroes fight against heavy odds (the importers and LB govt).
Heroes fight for good versus evil. Heroes understand justice and fairness. The local sheriff (IB govt)
has abdicated his duties, vca^t help. In this well-known Wild West image, a vigilante hero rides into
town, taking matters into his own hands and saves the day. Who will save Steel?
A SBXND STEP: F.K. IVERSCN, STATEMENTS, INIERVIB^B, AND QUESTICNNAIRE.
9 Context. While integrated steel firms have been trying to catch up to modem technology, losing
market share, closing plants, and losing money; Nucor has been pioneering innovations, gaining market
share, opening plants, and making money. This probably accounts for the attention Mr. Iverson has been
getting from news media. Congress, and analysts. Nucor is also notable for its flat organization
structure and its ununsual compensation system,
a RESEARCH qUESTIQ^
-Perspectives. For our second step we wanted a second strategist whose statements we could compare
to Roderick's. We also wanted a more direct form of access than simply public statements. We needed
P thicker" descriptions and ways for evaluating public statements against otter forms of expression. -
Dxuments versus questionnaires. In particular, we wanted a chance to compare a strategist's public
\
statements to what he might say in a personal interview or write on a structured research questionnaire.
'
•.MEIHCD
- Case Study. Our contacts with Iverson include a case study of Nucor, consulting, and research
I
I
I
using cognitive maps. We studied Nucor, wrote a business strategy case on Nucor, read Iverson's
statements, and interviewed Mr. Ivarson at length.
- Selecting a Document. After stxjdTing many of Iversoo's speeches and statements, we coded a speech
he made in IQ&i at the North Carolina World Trade Association about steel industry problems and
conditions (IVsp).
From a total of 75 concepts in that speech we selected twenty key concepts. We designed a 21 X 21
matrix. Iverson filled out the matrix by writing a score in each cell (421 scores!). The scores in each
rplT of the matrix represent Mr. Iverson's judgements about cause-effect interrelationships: from +3 (a
strong direct effect) to (no effect) to -3 (a strong inverse effect). This map (TVq) is shown in
Exhibit Two.
- Speech vgsus Questionnaire. We wanted to find out whether the questionnaire approach would yield
results different from the map-from-dociiments approach. The speech contained 24 specific concept-
affects-other concept pairs which could be checked on the questionnaire. Only one pair differed.
Therefore, we made a preliminary determination that Mr. Iversons beliefs remained reasonably consistent
across the time period, and that the questionnaire method generates data "^milar to statements (at least
for this specific case). Additional analyses comparing discussion, speeches, interviews, written
documents, and questionnaires will help us find out how maps generated by these forms differ.
CCMPARING TWO Sn^THIKIS CDOfrrrVE MAPS
The maps are enormously complex. Finding ways to categorize and manipulate these maps poses a key
challenge in developing and refining mapping. The comparisons which follow represent tentative attempts
Co explore this challenge.
6 DO THE MAPS 3iARE (XNCEFIS? The more concepts which two participants share, and the more they agree
about interrelatianships among concepts, the stronger their "culture" (Sathy, 1985). In this definition,
"culture" is nearly equivalent to shared schemas. We wondered whether Roderick's and Iverson's
statements share a "steel industry culture."
To make a comparison, we selected one of Mr. Roderick's texts (RODtxtl, n=77 concepts) which
contained about as many concepts as Mr, Iverson's speech (IVsp, n=72 concepts). Using a hierarchical
coding scheme, judges sorted each concept into a primary category based on agency. "Agency" means, "who
#
owns the concept, whose action, whose condition?" For example, the corcept WAGE EEMANDB usually belongs
to Steelworker's Union. If no agency can be established tte cotx:ept-label default is, "structural".
#
Words in CAPITALS indicate concepts used in subject's texts.
For instance, the ccxicept PRICES does not belong to a specific group, so PRICES is structniral. Next,
each concept was sorted into a secondary category: 'Statics," or "Dynamics," or "Affects." Statics
include circumstances, conditicxis, or characteristics of an agait. Dynamics include processes, actions,
^or behaviors of an agent. Affects include norms, motivations, and needs of an agent.
- Differep^p^ Exhibit Four illustrates the results. We noted differences in the patterns of the
two maps. First, the identity of agents differs. Iverson mentions QJSIDMEIS and Roderick does not.
Roderick statements name INm?NAnCNAL LENDING AQEIXilES, WCRLD STEEL, and US STEEL CDMPANY, but Iverson's
statements do not.
^fore intriguing, however, agents have different relative salience. For example, Roderick's text
stipulated 7 DOMESTIC STEEL 03MPANIES concepts. In contrast, Iverson's text maitions no fewer than 29
DCMESHC STEEL GCMPANY concepts. Conversely, RCDtxtl includes 22 FOREIGN EXPORTERS concepts but IVsp
notes only 7 FOREIGN EXPORTERS concepts. Another large difference manifests itself in terms of
SiroCTURAL agents. Of RCDtxtl's 77 concepts, 29 (38K) fit into the STRUCTURAL category. IVsp uses only
12 STRUCTURAL concepts out of 72 (16%). Next, let us partially compare the statements at a more
disaggregated level.
- DOMESTIC STEEL COMPANIES' statics, affects, and dynamir.-^ We compared a set of 208 Roderick
concepts CRCCtxt2) to Iverson's speech (IVsp). Exhibit Five shows a partial comparison of oxcepts
about DOMESTIC STEEL OGMPANIES. How many topics and specific concepts (under tte agecy of DCMESTIC STEEL
OCWPANIES) do the two maps share? If we group "Topics" together, out of 17 topics, 7 (41^ are unique (2
for IVsp only, 5 for RCDtxt2 only). Out of a total of 88 concepts compared, 24 or (27%) are unique to
one of the two maps (10 for IVsp, 14 for RCDtxt2).
- Simi larities, The two maps share certain similarities. Both maps disclose a similar proportion
rof Statics versus Dynamics versus Affects. Both maps include SIEELWCRKEIS as a very marginal agent.
jJjjAT CAUSES STEEL DflUSIRY PRCBLE>S?
All texts argue that domestic steel companies face difficult problems. Where do these problems
originate? Exhibit Six makes this comparison. This exhibit compares IVq to RCDtxt2 in terms of direct
*
relationships between corcepts and STEEL INDUSTRY WELFARE.
Using Iverson (IVq) we can ask, "How (if at all) does a particular concept affect DOMESTIC STEEL
9
OOMPANIES' '.WELFARE?" Causal concepts are listed in the left-hand column. Column "A" lists effects on
SrSL INHJSTOY '.VnJFARE stipulated by Iverson. Column "0' lists effects stipulated by Roderick (RDDtxt2).
For example, according to both Iverson and Roderick statements AMERICAN STEEL MIUSmY EFFICIENCY (1)
boosts AMERICAN STEEL MUSTRY WELFARE.
Summarizing Exhibit Six, we find that the two strategists statements agree about roost (but not eill)
comparable relationships between causal concepts and AMERICAN STEEL IMUSIRY WELFARE. Notable exceptions
include:
— AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY WAGES (9): (Iverson "positive" effect on WELFARE, Roderick
"negative."). Iverson texts associate high WAGES with high productivity (Nucor's experience), but
Roderick texts associate high WAGES with high costs ( US Steel .experienceX
— FOREIGN SmL EXPORTERS WELFARE (14) : (Iverson statements argue that FSE WELFARE is opposed
to DOMESTIC b'lhiL WELFARE, but Roderick specifies no relationship. This difference reflects a Roderick
text theme. The texts claims that various parties interests (WELFARE) are not necessarily in conflict, a
position which Iverson rejects.
— IMPCRT RESIRICnCNS (11): Iverson argues that IMPORT RESTRICnOC have a negative effect on
DOMESTIC STEEL WELFARE, And, he says that this effect is negligible. On the other hand, Roderick claims
that IMPORT RESIRICTICre are not only "positive", but literally a "life-or-death" issue for the DOMESTIC
STEEL WELFARE.
*
From other analyses (not shown) we find Iverson stating that IMPORTS help USA WELFARE. Roderick
protests. Iversons says IMPCKIS don't harm NATIONAL EEFITEE, Roderick says they do. Iverson claims that
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES don't constitute a significant advantage to FCRnCN STEEL EXPORTERS.
Roderick disagrees. Iverson declares that SELLING UNDER COST is a perfectly acceptable business tactic
Rodalck disputes it,
;;^Indirect Consequences, Che interesting question is whether a map "behaves well". In a well-
behaved map, higher-order consequences mirror lower-order consequences. Even if strategists understand
"true relationshps," they could make serious mistakes if the indirect effects of actions had net
consequences opposite to the direct, obvious consequences. Mapping allows us to examine indirect
consequences as well as direct relationships.
Exhibit Seven shows the relationship (according to IVq) between 21 concepts and STEEL INDUSTRY
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\i/ELFARE. It includes direct consequences (concept x — concept y), indirect consequences (concept x —
concept y — concept z), and third-level consequences (concept x — concept y — concept z — concept a).
The "variables" which could do the most to increase STEEL INEUSIEY WELFARE include: INCREASING BASIC IB
|SrRENGIHS (19, +2794), increasing CAFTTAL EWESIMENF (8, +2522), and increasing raXUCTIVrrY CF US
WCSKPCRCE (10, +2489). This map is quite well-behaved, Chly 2 concepts have reverse consequences at the
higher orders, FOREIGN SITIL EFFICIENCY (5) and WAOS CF SIEEL WORKERS (9).
IVq's consistency across orders contrasts sharply with analyses of Roderick's maps. Exhibit Three
shows that Roderick's RCDtxt2 policy proposals have numerous, significant indirect consequaices contrary
to the stated intention of increasing DOMESTIC STEEL WELFARE. This comparison must merely suggestive
because RlXtxt2 only includes signs, not magnitudes.
9 WHAT AFttL'lS THE LEVEL CF SIEEL IMFCKIS?
A pressing policy question for the steel industry — indeed for the naticm itself . . . '^fhat
can/could/should/might affect steel imports?" Exhibit Eight reports IVq first through fourth-order
effects on IMPCKIS (18) of changes in other variables. According to IVq, policies of: adding to ASI LCNG
TERM ADVAOTAGES (19, -48512), increasing CAPITAL WVESmENI (8, -44163), produce the biggest reduction in
IMPORTS. Declines in FOREIGN SIEEL EFHCIENCY (5, ^307), and increasing AMEKECAN OGMFElTriVE ADVAOTAGE
(2, -17205), surprisingly produce the smallest effects on IMPORTS. PRCITH:nCNISM BY US GOVT (11, 23179)
produces an increase in IMPORTS!!
f qUALITAnVE
We plan to "deconstruct" these texts (and others) which form an important part of the discourse
about steel industry conditions (Calas & Smircich, 1985). Our present comments below, merely convey our
ijnpressions drawn from a significant amount of contact with these texts.
I
- Uncertainty
. In order to make a rough estimate of how much uncertainty these maps expressed, we
analysed the two primary documents (RCDl & IVsp). We decked each cause-effect linkage for any words
which convey a sense of "less-than-certain." For example, OCNCHT A "could" harm OCNCErT B, or Q^XHT A
"might" reduce CONCEPT B, or CONCEPT A "probably" will affect CONCEPT B, indicates probabilistic
relationships.
Neither strategist's statements express much uncertainty. RODtxtl established 67 causal
j
connections, only one of which was 'less-than-certain." Oddly, tf« beginning of RCDtxtl announces:
1 11
1 don't lcr»w about clocks, but I do know there's little certainty about the immediate future
of steel ... In short, what yxiu see is not what you get . . ."
But next, it reverses itself:
" The i'^'^ipg; are not buried or obscure. Beginning students in business and economics can identify
them. Perhaps this is why they escape the full understanding of their instructors,"
IVsp contains 59 fantsil assertions. Of these, 5 convey a bit of uncertainty. But, five of 59 (S^
is hardly rampant with uncertainty.
- Ideology. Both strategists' texts express steadfast loyalty toward principles of free enterprise.
The virtues of FREE TRAIE, FREE MARKETS and and the salutary effects of FTOE OOMPEmiCN are taken for
granted. Iverson texts appeal to these ideals to justify government restraint. We must endure pain
because the market guarantees that everything will turn out CK in the end. On the other hand, Roderick
statements bend the same dogma as a weapon: to vilify foreign exporters and their governments, to
castigate international lending agencies, and to spur additional US government involvement — to restore
FTOE ENTERreiSE. Additionally, Roderick's statements promote strong moral overtones. Oie complains, "
Conversely, should we let them (Brazil) bring steel up here? Where's the equity? \\/here's our sense of
justice?" tktE ENltKPRTSF. entails moral obligations as well as utilitarian calculations.
8 CUfMI. In quantitative as well as qualitative terms, Iverson's texts attributes much more control to
Cbmestic Steel Companies. Roderick argues that DOMESTIC SIEEL CCMPANIES are nearly telpless. Their fate
is controlled by distant, malevolent forces.
> THE FUTURE
.
Of the texts, Iverson's offer a more optimistic vision of the future. Roderick talks
about avoiding the bleak future and returning to the status quo ante. Roderick mentions the 'TDrwellian"
connotations of 1964!
t SUMMARY. Analysis of these cognitive maps reveals interesting and significant differences in
statements attributable to very-experienced steel strategists. They identify different sets of
participants in steel, and implirity assign them different relative importances. They differ markedly in
their anal>'3is of the effects of TMPCKrS, and what role the U.S. GOVERNMENT should play. Iverson's map
(IVq) 'Whvbs" more consistently across levels. Iverson's statements imply more Domestic Steel Company
control. The strategist's views of the future differ sharply.
Neither strategist expresses much uncertainty about causal relationships. All texts steadfastly
subscribe to FWE ENIH^PRISE pnuYnples.
CBSERVATICIE AND DIREETrCDS
Based upon these preliminary studies, we offer observations. These observations are
preliminary, speoilative and intentionally provocative.
^ • CESEBVATICNS ABOUT SIT^TOSY SfflEMAS AND Sn^IKJC THINnNG.
- Do Maps Capture Schematic Knowledge? At this stage, much of our information (not all) has been
derived from public statements. Communication is not equivalent to schematic knowledge. We all i<now
that what people think and what they say are not always the same.
- Schema dimensions. Both strategist's texts carry a large inventory of concepts involving steel
industry conditions. Roderick's larger map (PCCtxt2) contains over 2CD concepts. At what level does
mapping exhaust the strategist's reservoir of relevant concepts, or reach diminishing returns? Or, can a
strategist keep producing concepts ad infinitum?
- Complex Strategy Problems and Cognitive Simplification. Preliminary analysis shows that these two
strategists can describe interrelationships among numerous concepts. But, a few important arguments (<x
rhetorical clusters) dominate their policy perspectives. Moreover, Roderick's "misbehaving^' concepts,
and both strategists' minimization of uncertainties in steel, raise doubts about whether these
strategists approach ill-structured, complex policy problems as tentatively as theorists recommend (Mason
& Mitroff , 1981). Or to put it another way, 'T^an/Db strategists really think about organized complexity:
Can they use what they know? If strategists approach "wicked" problems with assumptions consistent
with well-structured problems, important implications for strategy follow.
- T .i npflr Relationships. In written texts, in interviews, and in structured questionnaires; both
executives' texts relied entirely on linear-monotonic relationships between causal variables and effect
.
variables. Iverson remarked to us that, for all intents and purposes, and over a wide range of values,
linear-monotonic relationships work fine. Do strategists often discern other types of relationships?
- Fppdhack Loops. Coding speeches and written documents generated few feedback loops (as Axelrod,
1976). But the questionnaire (IVq) generated many feedback loops. The questionnaire forced Iverson to
specifically think about 21 X 21 relationships. Mr. Iverson commeited that doing the matrix was
interesting because ".
. . it made me think about things I had not thought about before."
- Limitations. These executives are important figures in the steel industry. Given their personal
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interests, Cheir stewardship positions, and their advocacy of political options, these maps might embody
intentional omissions, rationalizations, and justifications which do not accurately reflect their "real"
thoughts or qrhpma.«; about steel industry conditions.
9 CBSn?VATICNS RELATING TO ODGNmVE MAPPED; mHJiqUE.
- Do tte Maps Share a 'tMture?" '^^t^n•^a^ maps (and underlying strategy schemas) imply similar
"culture". Using a broad definition of schematic similarity, we found that these statements cause-effect
maps contain a large subset of unique rhetorical clusters — even without taking different connotations
into account. Of course, Iverson knows the 'Roderick" concept '^TOTTABILXn", and Roderick knows the
"Iverson" concept "INNCVATICN". But, the statements of "core positions?' did not use these concepts.
•As we make more specific comparisons, the differences become more pronounced. Therefore, these two
strategists statements talk about different "entities* when each refers to STEFL IMUSIOT.
feving no standards against which to jxxlge these data, it is hard to assess to what degree these two
strategists share a "steel cultxire." Would comparisons of larger and larger maps multiply or reduce
the similarities? Ebw can we define "culture" and measure cultural sharing?
-^TTie Computer Software. Computer programs are a powerful tool for organizing, manipulating, and
gaining insights about maps. Using the computer constitutes a significant improvement over a strictly
"intuitive" approach to analyzing a complicated text. Finding out how to extend the computer's power- to
analyze complicated texts is a major challenge.
- Limitation U Language texts, particularly texts of speeches for example, leave out quite a bit
of infarmation. Combinations of voice, gesticulation, and appearance can affect the meaning of speech,
- Limitation 2. Cognitive mapping is useful, but incomplete. Mapping fai1« to adequately reflect
connotations, metaphors, and symbols. We plan to use qualitative techniques to probe deeper into these I
- Limitation 3. Cognitive mapping imposes a kind of linear, tight logic on the text. It allows a
type of lexical, complicated analysis which highlights inconsistencies and "errors." Whether this fcrm
allows the faithful representation of schematic knowledge is a big question. Ch tte other hand, it
permits a rigorous evaluation of policy arguments for their internal coherence.
Rather than Crying to exonerate cognitive mapping from potentially limiting issues, we suggest
that mapping merits testing.
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• CBSEKVAnONS RELATOG TO ENACIMENE.
- Schemas and Enactment. Enactment is an evoluticxiary process, involving thinking, behavior, and
interaction. Cause and effect maps only represent a cognitive, static dimension of an aiactment process.
^
- Subjective Worlds. We had access to official talk. Few of their remarks explicitly tell us what
they personally feel about the industry, or how they see themselves as part of industry activity.
Therefore, our account falls short of a fully subjective, interpretive study (See ^en, et aL, 1983).
t CESERVAUCNS ABCUT IHE SIEEL IMIBIRY.
- ControL Larwood & Whitaker (1977) claim that successful persons fall prey to "illusiais of
control". Our more-successful strategist, Iverson, assigned a major role to domestic steel companies, in
blaming them for their present predicament and for forging their future. Roderick described trapped,
vulnerable, helpless, domestic steel companies. Perhaps we should name this phenomenon "Disillusicns of
Control."
- What transformation? Much research shows that knowledge structures tenaciously resist change
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Roderick's texts are ambiguous on this point. In one sense, they argue change.
He says that the steel industry has become "international" and conditions in the industry, such as
prices, market share, debt, and profits "violate" traditional (healthy) norms. That is why he is calling
for important policy changes from the government. But, at a deeper level, the steel industry is largely
unchanged. It is unchanged in the sense that the same concepts (prices, etc) apply. Moreover, the
cause-effect connections between concepts has not changed (for example, "high prices" are still
"desirable", "regulation" remains undesirable, etc). In this second sense of transformation, his
schematic knowledge has proven resistant to change. Iverson's theories are different, but hardly more
flexible.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Additional research tasks beckon:
- Trace changes in maps. We have data which will allow us to examine how various participants' maps
about steel industry conditions may have changed during a 5 year period.
- Explore the potential of maps for representing schematic knowledge of industry conditions and
strategies.
- Link maps to events and brfiavior. Do companies initiate strategies consistent with strategists'
schemas? What is the relationship between schemas and industry processes and events?
- Interaction. How do strategists' maps interact? We are now studying the long-term strategic
interaction between USS and the United Steelworkers' Lhion to find out.
- Literary Criticism. Cognitive mapping is weak in the area of connotations, imagery, and meaning.
We think that literary analysis can complement cognitive mapping.
- Extend computer software techniques for organizing and analyzing maps. Can we develop standard
analyses for evaluating complex policy arguments?
Over the Icng-tenn, this research should produce an intergative progression of studies. These studies
aim to establish the usefulness of enactment, schemas, and cognitive mapping for research and practice.
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,EXHIBIT THREEl
SFTFrTED KET NEGATIVE Ltm.'l'b OF STZEL niDUSTiJT POUCIZS
HOW DOES STEEL INDUSTR
roua AFFECT:
(1) Union Utilttr
t
DIRECT
none
troiRECT
none
THIIID-OESEX
571
(3) USA Utility 501 none SV.
(5) StMl FlfM' Util 501 3i: 53Z
1 (7) PrtcM none m: 3K
1^(9) Profits none 25Z 57-
"^ (13) Efflclancr none none 601
(IS) D*alrabl* U.S.
Con Pollclei
lOOZ 1001 1005
i>lr«ct EffecM - jSteal Policies! *<E£fect Categoryj
Indirect Effects - iSteel Pollcle3J~~lSoma Cace^oryt—fefecc Cateaor^
"nilrd* |Ste«l Polteleaf ' <t>o«e Cacegoryr"^Another Cater.prjj
Order —
Effect
it_Category
For each of the levels that we reviewed: direct. Indirect, and third
order, slaple suas of the signs were calculated. For example, in the first
order table of categories (Exhibit U) fOREICN GOVT POLICIES (row 18)
concepts exert five separate effects of some unknown "+" or "-"
composition upon U.S. STEEL FIRMS' UTILITY Ccol. 5), If we then turn to a
net-sun table (Exhibit lb) we find that the corresponding intersection
(18,5) shows -3. When we add the raw data entries comprising (18.3). minus
3 Is the total. Taking both exhibits into account, we reeson that 5
entries can add to minus three only when 4 entries are negative and I entry
is positive. So, Exhibit 4 shows tia the net effects of the row category
upon the coluan category, 'fote. however, that '*net effects'* refers only to
the net of nuabera of effects, not to magnitudes of effecta*
EXHIBIT FOUR
J
EXHIBIT FOIR: PAKHCIPMnS AND CATFTrRTRS OF ACllVl'l'ili IN STEH.
3CURCE - IVsp aixl KDcxtl
Agents N OMirnaE DYNAMICS Al-^TOTVE
HEtxtl
Dtnescic Steel Cce. 7 3 4
United States 2 1
Intemat'l LoxUng A^ts. 3 1 2
U.S. Govt 6 3 3
StPPlwrrkPTS 2 2
World Steel 1 1
United States Steel (i. 5 3 2
Foreisn Govts 22 8 9 5
Structural agaits 29 21 1 7
TOTAL 77 35 IS 24
IVsp
rHnpgf-ir Steel Cce, 29 17 8 4
United States 7 1 1 5
Intsnat'l lendlrg Agts.
U.S. Govt D 2 11
Steelwnrtas 1 1
World Steel
United States Stppl Oi.
Foreign Govts 7 3 3 1
Structural Agents 12 8 1 3
Custonera 3 1 2
TOTAL 72 31 18 15
1
EXHIBIT FIVEi
1
EDOnHTT FOR
dWARDG TW SIRAiHJISlb "HJfSnC Sim. OWANT CDOPIS
SMRQ) Iversoi Roderick Gaicepts
TCPICS Concepts Concepts IKIQUE CO Iverson #
Capital 2 7 "Innovaticns" 3
Contlixious Casting 2 2 "Admin. Overtead 1
Old Plants 3 10 "Long-term
Gx^Brative Advantage 2 2 strengths." 6
rapnriry 1 6 total 10
*ges 1 2 UCQUE CO Roderick
3 "Pro£itabilic>-" 5
Effirimcy 4 5 "Prirps" 4
Wplfarp (of irir\) 3 8 "Inflation" 1
total 19 45 'Marketing"
uiBiplovuia It"
3
1
total 14
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EXHIBIT SIX
«ttT VARIABLES AfFHT THE WELFARE CF THE OltSTlC SIHL MUSITTT
EJTHT CH COfSnC Sim. WEUARE
rAi?vu, ootiyis
AbxziUim CO Ivenon According to ftxla-ick
(IVq) (ROtonJ)
1. ^BTan Steel Efficiacv oosiave positive
2. A«Bn£3i Coajarauve Wvancaje positive positive
3. Aoerlcan Steel Imovatioi POSlUvt positive
i. Adopting TecJiiolajT Advances pnmuvg positive
5. Foreij^i 5rwl Effioencv ne^tive negative
6. US Lbrt LiwxT f^linps negative negative
7. ne^BUvt n^auvB
8. Capital positive positive
9. *?« positive negative
10. Productivity positive positive
U. Protection negauve positive
12. riwrrmT "Elfare positive zero
W. Foreifli Expcrcer Welfare negative zem
15. positive negative
16. F(T«i^ "jovt tbliriea negauve ne^tlve
17. Open >teVets positive positive
18. Farel^ Steel jrorts negative negative
19. Bbbu: L.T. Scranjtns positive no data
2D. Aaencan Steel F\jt. PrabloiB no data
21. Caitnbuuai ot Steel to
ISA «lfare positive
ICer: "positive" nans direct, "negative"
> subject does not mention, "zsr
positive
invoke.
no relationship.
EXHIBIT SEVEN'
EXHmrr SEVEN : UDOLT AND INDIRBCT ETFECTS CF CnCEPTS Oi STHl. MUSIW WELFAf
SOUSCJ- IVq
CnCHTS
1. AMES STEH. EFFICHNCY
2. AMES. ajPErmvE ^mwrtcz
3. MWAnoe IN AMER STEEL
i. HVR SnEL ADOPT ran ADV
5. FtREICH Sim. EFFICmO
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7. US am REuuncN cf steil
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9. VtaS OF US STEHiCRKHK
10. PHumvrn of us ucrkhke
U. PIDIHTICNI31 BY US OVT
12. WELFARE OF AMER STEH. OEITJfJS
13. WELFARE OF AMER STEH. INaJSTRY
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15. WELFARE CF AfCX SIHLWCFKH5
16. KlSiat dVT SIHL Ruais
17. QMHUC IN FREE TRAIE. OR* MCT
18. IMOTIS OF FCREIOI STEH. TO IB
19. BASIC. LNG-TW US STEH. SIWICnE
Z). FUIDRE ™cai>6 OF US STEH.
21. ArtR siHL cam. TD UE am asm
$
Product of all direct and InUrect causal paths
. CRIIR 2nd CRm! 3rd CKB
66 1998
20 930
«8 1409
sa 2361
-1 12 370
-1 -34 -1017
-2 -64
-1795
84 2522
-35 -1209
76 2489
-2 -42 -1311
65 2170
8B 2366
-2 -18 -718
47 1400
-1
-33 -1097
67 2465
-1
-661
37 2794
-3
-81 -2579
72 2452
lEXHIBIT EIGHT
tTHllilT ElfflT : ETFBCIS CN I>PCR1S
SOUCE- IVq
CtNIFIS IsE (KEER 2nl CRIB!
1. AfCR STEH. EFFICTEICY -3
2. H€R. OM^ll'lVE mWTftZ -2
3. IWrVAnCTE IN AMER ?TEn.
-I
4. Aft? STEH. AOPT TKH ADV -2
5. FfXESSii TTEEL tlUCUJCY 2
6. US OCVT POIOES O MTflS -1
7. IS am REEILATICH OF STEH. 2
8. CAPITAL INVESI>efT FCR STEH. -1
9. VICE OF 'JS STEELWHCERS 2
10. PmrTTVTTY T iJS urRTTKE -2
u. (HJiHjnanai ar tjs oovi -2
12. IfljARE OF AffR STEH. OJSICMERS -2
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14. IBJARE OF FTREICM STEH. EXPTRS 2
15. WELFARE OF AfB! sTEaWKCHS -1
16. Py^Qi rxm JTEH. POICIES 2
17. gTfETDC IN FREE TRAIE, CRI rtCT 1
18. Maris OF RREICW STEH. TO US
19. BASIC. UC-TW IJS Sim. SITOCIH -2
2D. RmiSE PKHi>6 OF UB SIIH. 2
21. AMER STEEL CTNTR. TO IB K GRIH -1
S
Product of all direct and indirect cauaai paths
-29
4
-25
-52
-11
19
36
-56
9
-40
27
-35
-S3
-1
-25
6
-45
-6
-46
42
-39
3rd CKCER
-1097
-555
-782
-1237
-276
580
951
-1318
676
-1385
Wl
-1180
-1260
431
-744
610
-1395
429
-1539
1436
-1359
S
4th CRLER
-36118
-172C5
-24701
-42018
-4307
17314
320i4
-44163
22344
-42836
23179
-37778
-41504
13277
-25006
20695
-41021
10287
-48512
44645
-42344
i
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